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European Union Law and Public Procurement* 
 
Martin Trybus** 
 
This paper discusses the law of the European Union (EU) on public procurement by 
providing an overview of both the primary law principles and foundations emanating from 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the detailed rules of a set 
of secondary procurement Directives. The latter have to be transposed into the national laws 
of the 28 Member States and are then applied by their contracting authorities and entities. 
The analysis also includes the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) and a short evaluation of the principles applying to contracts falling outside 
the field of application of the procurement Directives.        
 
 
1. Introduction1 
The 28 Member States of the EU form the largest public procurement market in the world. In 
2015, about 250,000 contracting authorities on the national, regional, and local levels 
awarded contracts for about €3 trillion.2 This is an average 14 per cent of the national GDP in 
the Member States, or 13.1 per cent of the Union’s GDP (excluding utilities and defence).3 
While the importance of public contracts for the economy varies from Member State to 
Member State, the significance is always considerable.  
The law of the EU affects public contracts to varying degrees, depending on the 
‘phase’ the contract is in. The ‘life’ of a public contract can be divided into three more or less 
distinct phases: (1) the definition of a need for a good, service or work, (2) the procurement 
procedure leading to the award of the contract, and finally (3) the contract management 
                                                 
*English version of a paper in Spanish published as Martin Trybus, “El Derecho de la Unión Europea y la 
contratación publica” in Alberto Montaña Plata and Jorge Iván Rincón Córdoba (eds.) Contratos Públicos: 
Problemas, Perspectivas y Prospectivas – XVIII Jorrnadas Internacionales de Derecho Administrativo (Universidad 
Externado de Colombia: Bogotá, 2017) 743-781.  The paper was delivered in English at the XVIII Jorrnadas 
Internacionales de Derecho Administrativo  at the Universidad Externado de Colombia in Bogotá on 1 
September 2017. 
**Professor of European Law and Policy and Director of the Institute of European Law, University of 
Birmingham, United Kingdom.  
1 Part of this introduction are based on the introduction to Trybus, Caranta, and Edelstam (eds.), EU Law of 
Public Contracts: Public Procurement and Beyond (Bruylant: Brussels, 2014), at 1-2. The author also used 
extracts from Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe: the EU Defence and Security Directive in 
Context (CUP: Cambridge, 2014) and Trybus, “Public procurement in European Union internal market law”, in 
R. Nogouellou and U. Stelkens (eds.) Comparative Law on Public Contracts Treatise (Bruylant: Brussels, 2010) 
81-121. Leading Spanish language literature on EU public procurement law (including on its effect on Spanish 
procurement law) includes: Gimeno Feliú, El control de la contratación pública: las normas comunitarias y su 
adaptación en España (Cívitas: Madrid, 1995); La nueva contratación pública europea y su incidencia en la 
legislación española: la necesaria adopción de una nueva ley de contratos públicos y propuestas de reform 
(Madrid: Editorial Civitas, 2006); El nuevo paquete legislativo comunitario sobre contratación pública: de la 
burocracia a la estrategia : (el contrato público como herramienta del liderazgo institucional de los poderes 
públicos) (Aranzadi: Cizur Menor, Navarra, 2014); and Moreno Molina, El nuevo derecho de la contración 
pública de la Únion Europea, directivas 4.0 (Chartridge Books Oxford, 2015) 
https://ruidera.uclm.es/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10578/7893/9781911033097.pdf?sequence=1 [accessed 14 
March 2017]. Thanks to Dr Albert Sánchez Graells (University of Bristol) for providing this selection. 
2 According to 2016 figures provided by the European Commission the annual procurement volume of public 
authorities and utilities in the EU of 27 in 2015 was 3 trillion or 13.1 per cent of the GDP (excluding utilities 
and defence). See: European Commission: Public Procurement Indicators 2015, DG Growth, Brussels, 16 Dec 
2016: https://www.pianoo.nl/sites/default/files/documents/documents/publicprocurementindicators2015-eu-
december2016.pdf [accessed 21 March 2017].   
3 Ibid. 
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during the lifetime of the concluded contract. The first phase defining the need of the public 
entity or utility is largely unaffected by EU law. National, regional, and local constitutional 
rules regulating the budget and decision-making provide the only relevant legal frameworks 
here. This might change with the emergence of an ‘economic government’ for the EU or the 
Eurozone but currently there is no EU law on this first phase. The third or contract 
management phase is affected, but only to a very limited extent. It is the second phase, from 
the publication of the contract notice until the award of the contract, the public procurement 
phase strictu sensu, which is most extensively affected by EU law. This is due to the fact that 
while the first phase deals with what to buy and the third phase with how the eventual 
contract is administered, the second phase addresses the question of who to procure the good, 
service or work from. The question who to conclude the contract with might be answered 
with a provider from another Member State, and this makes the second phase relevant for the 
Internal Market, the core regime of the EU.   
This paper discusses the public procurement law of the EU. First, the primary EU law 
emanating from the core regimes of the TFEU is discussed. Second, the relevant secondary 
law, based on legal bases in the TFEU, passed by the EU institutions created by the TFEU, 
and enshrined in a set of detailed procurement Directives, is addressed. Third, the crucial 
contribution of the case law of the CJEU to EU public procurement law is highlighted. 
Fourth, the role of Member States transposing the EU Directives into their national 
procurement laws is explained. Fifth and finally, the chapter returns to both the role of the 
TFEU and the Court when discussing the EU law principles applying to contracts falling 
outside the scope of the Directives. The entire chapter aims to show the crucial role of the 
TFEU in all the other addressed dimensions of EU procurement law.       
  
2. Primary EU law: the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union4 
The establishment of an Internal Market between EU Member States is at the very heart of 
European integration. The second indent of the Preambles of the TFEU (the former EC 
Treaty, before that EEC Treaty) declares that the Member States are: “Resolved to ensure the 
economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers 
which divide Europe, […].” The Internal Market is then stipulated partly as an area of 
exclusive EU competence in Article 3 TFEU but mainly as an area of shared competence 
between EU and the Member States in Article 4 TFEU. Moreover, the commitment to 
establish an Internal Market is reiterated in Article 26(3) TFEU which provides that: “[t]he 
internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty.” The Internal Market regimes of the TFEU most relevant to public and utilities 
procurement are the free movement of goods, the free movement of services, and the freedom 
of establishment. Furthermore, the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality in Article 18 TFEU is to be mentioned. These Internal Market regimes and Article 
18 TFEU essentially consist of prohibitions of protectionist behaviour directed at the Member 
States. In other words, the respective provisions of the Treaties ban Member States from 
practices raising barriers to trade for goods and services and the freedom of establishment. In 
addition to the Internal Market regimes and Article 18 TFEU, a number of other economic 
regimes dealing with distortions of competition in the Internal Market and partly directed at 
the Member States and partly at companies have a certain relevance to public procurement.5 
These shall not be discussed in the context of this chapter on EU law and public procurement. 
                                                 
4 This section of the chapter lends from Trybus, “Public procurement in European Union internal market law”, 
supra note 1. 
5 The rules on State aid are regulated in Articles 107 et seq TFEU. On the relevance of this regime to public 
contracts see Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (OUP,3rd ed. 2014) at 302-324. The 
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2.1 Free movement of goods 
At the core of the EU Internal Market is the free trade area for goods (Article 28 TFEU).6 
‘Goods’ are very widely defined as “products which can be valued in money and which are 
capable of forming the subject of commercial transactions.”7 A crucial provision is Article 30 
TFEU which prohibits all customs duties on imports and exports of goods between Member 
States and all charges having equivalent effect. The notion of ‘charges having equivalent 
effect to a customs duty’ is also very widely defined.8 If the Internal Market is the core of 
European integration, then the free trade area for goods is at the centre of that core. A 
Common Customs Tariff in relation to goods from third countries outside the EU ‘upgrades’ 
this free trade area to a customs union. According to Article 29 TFEU goods from third 
countries are treated like goods originating in a Member State once they are in free 
circulation. The prohibition of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect has no 
direct connection to the EU public procurement regime. However, the abolition of these 
charges eliminates barriers to trade and therefore also allows access to the public 
procurement markets of other Member States. It would obviously be difficult to offer the 
lowest price or be the economically most advantageous tender when you have to add eight 
per cent or more for customs duties to your bid price in another Member State. Hence Article 
30 TFEU is an essential prerequisite for a liberalised European procurement market. 
 
2.1.1. Prohibition of quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect 
The most important Internal Market provision with respect to the procurement of goods 
(supplies) is Article 34 TFEU according to which “[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and 
all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.” 
This prohibition is complemented by a similar provision for exports.9 A ‘quantitative 
restriction’ is defined as “any measure of a Member State that restraints the import, transit or 
export of a certain good [according to quantity or value].”10 However, quantitative 
restrictions in the strict sense do not occur very often in practice. Member States are not that 
unsophisticated and not that openly opposed to EU law. Thus the notion of “a measure having 
equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction” in Article 34 TFEU is crucial. It was given a 
                                                                                                                                                        
competition rules are regulated in Articles 101 and 102 et seq. TFEU (ex 81 and 82 et seq. EC Treaty). On the 
relevance of this regime to public contracts see: Arrowsmith, ibid. at 324-337. 
6 On the free movement in general see: Oliver et al, Oliver on Free Movement of Goods in the European Union 
(Hart: Oxford, 5th ed. 2010); Barnard and Scott (eds.), The Law of the Single European Market (Hart: Oxford, 
2002); Craig and de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, 6th ed. 2015), at 638-
720 (hereinafter EU Law); J. Weiler, “From Dassonville to Keck and Beyond: An Evolutionary Reflection on 
the Text and Context of the Free Movement of Goods”, in Craig and de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law 
(OUP: Oxford, 1999), chapter 10; Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
7 The CJEU in Case 7/68, Commission v. Italy (‘Arts Treasures’) [1968] ECR 423. This definition also applies 
to the important prohibition of quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect discussed below. 
8 The CJEU defined a charge having equivalent effect to a customs duty as: “[…] any pecuniary charge, 
however small and whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on domestic 
or foreign goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a custom duty in the strict 
sense, constitutes a charge having equivalent effect […] even if it is not imposed for the benefit of the State, is 
not discriminatory or protective in effect and if the product on which the charge is imposed is not in competition 
with any domestic product.” 
See: Case 24/68, Commission v. Italy (‘Statistical Levy’) [1969] ECR 193; [1971] CMLR 611; Joint Cases 
2&3/69, Sociaal Fonds for de Diamantarbeiders v. Brachfeld (‘Diamond Workers’) [1969] ECR 211; [1969] 
CMLR 335; Case C-29/87, Dansk Denkavit Aps v. Danish Ministry of Agriculture [1988] ECR 2965. 
9 Article 35 TFEU reads: “Quantitative restrictions on exports, and all measures having equivalent effect, shall 
be prohibited between Member States.” 
10 Case 2/73, Geddo v. Ente Nazionale Risi [1973] ECR 865, [1974] 1 CMLR 1. 
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very wide definition by the CJEU in the Dassonville11 judgment as: “[a]ll trading rules 
enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra-Community trade […].” Provided the EU has not introduced harmonising 
legislation on a particular good, the prohibition thus applies to all obstacles to the free 
movement of goods where they derive from rules regarding the characteristics of the good. 
These include rules regarding the form, size, weight, composition, labelling, packaging, or 
presentation, provided the good in question was lawfully manufactured in the other Member 
State. This is the case even when the rules in question apply without distinction to both 
domestic and non-domestic goods. 
In the traditional understanding, a measure can be considered outside the field of 
application of the prohibition of Article 34 TFEU if it represents a proportionate response to 
an overriding public interest or mandatory requirement. This principle of mandatory 
requirements was established by the Court of Justice in its famous Cassis judgment and 
includes “[...] the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the 
fairness of commercial transactions, and the defence of the consumer.”12 
Mandatory requirements are an open case law based category to which the Court of 
Justice has been adding new concepts, most notably the protection of the environment,13 the 
preservation of the variety of the media,14 or a peril to the financial balance of the social 
security system.15 The aim of the concept is to give Member States sufficient flexibility to 
respond to important public interests needs not foreseen in the Treaty which override the 
Internal Market without having to violate the Treaty. However, the use of these mandatory 
requirements or overriding public interest grounds is subject to the important principle of 
proportionality. This applies equally in the context of the derogations in Article 36 TFEU 
discussed below. 
The wide definition of a ‘measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative 
restriction’ in Dassonville led to an increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article 34 TFEU 
as a means of challenging any rules whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom. This 
was the main reason for the controversial Keck judgment in which, while upholding the 
previous case law regarding rules concerning the characteristics of the goods, the Court of 
Justice ruled that “[c]ontrary to what has previously been decided […] certain selling 
arrangements shall no longer be regarded as hindering State trade within the meaning of 
Dassonville.”16 
This introduced an important differentiation, whereby regulations concerning the 
characteristics of the goods are (still) covered by Article 34 TFEU whereas regulations 
concerning certain selling arrangements are (no longer) covered by Article 34 TFEU as long 
as they apply equally to all traders and have the same effect on imported and domestic goods. 
 
                                                 
11 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, [1974] 2 CMLR 436. Commission and Council 
had aimed providing some clarity on the notion with an illustrative list in Articles 1-3 Directive 70/50/EEC 
[1970] OJ Sp. ed. I-17 which included minimum or maximum prices specified for imported products, conditions 
in respect of packaging, composition, identification, size, weight, etc., which only apply to foreign goods, 
limiting publicity in respect of imported goods as compared with domestic products, and making it mandatory 
for importers of goods to have an agent in the importing MS. 
12 Case 120/78, REWE – Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (‚Cassis de Dijon’) [1979] 
ECR 649, [1979]3 CMLR 494. 
13 Case C-302/86, Commission v. Denmark (‘Danish Bottles’) [1986] ECR 4607. 
14 Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und Vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag 
(‘Familiapress’) [1997] 3 CMLR 1329. 
15 Case C-120/95, Decker [1995] ECR I-1831, [1998] 2 CMLR 879. 
16 Cases C-267 and C-268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993] ECR 
I-6097, [1995] 1 CMLR 101. 
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2.1.2. Application to public procurement 
It appears from the jurisprudence of the CJEU that not only procurement laws and policies 
and wider practices but also independent decisions taken in the context of procurement 
activities can constitute a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction in the 
sense of Article 34 TFEU.17 There is no de minimis rule whereby an act would be so 
insignificant that it would fall outside the prohibition.18 Article 34 TFEU applies to all 
central, federal, regional, and local authorities of the Member States and their emanations and 
all bodies governed by public law for which the Member States can be held responsible,19 to 
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.20 It is clear that it applies to 
the acts of contracting authorities subject to the Directives discussed in section 3 below. It is 
not clear whether it also applies to private utilities operating on the basis of special or 
exclusive rights, but it appears that it does not apply to other private persons or entities.21 
Hence all public procurement related laws and actions have to satisfy the requirements of the 
TFEU regime on the free movement goods. The procurement of goods (supplies) is covered 
by Article 34 TFEU. 
 
2.1.3. Justifications and proportionality 
The prohibitions in Articles 34 and 35 TFEU are not absolute. Article 36 TFEU provides: 
“The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on 
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or 
public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection 
of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States.” 
Therefore, in addition to the flexibility provided through the case law based concept 
of mandatory requirements, the TFEU itself stipulates a number of public interest grounds 
that can justify proportionate Member State measures derogating from the prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect. The derogation may even 
apply to measures that discriminate against foreign goods. The aim is to provide Member 
States with the flexibility to take necessary measures to protect a number of interests within 
their responsibility, which are so well known and crucial that they could already be directly 
accommodated in the text of the TFEU itself. Exceptions reflecting grounds justifying 
derogation in Article 36 TFEU are also part of the Directives discussed in section 3 below.22 
                                                 
17 See: Case C-243/89, Commission v. Denmark (‘Storebaelt’) [1993] ECR I-3353 where the contracting entity’s 
requirement in the specifications to include national products and labour was held to be incompatible with 
Article 34 TFEU (then Article 30 EEC); Case C-359/93, Commission v. The Netherlands (‘UNIX’) [1995] ECR 
I-157; Case C-59/00, Bent Mousten Vestergaard v. Spøttrup Boligselskab [2001] ECR I-9505. See also 
Arrowsmith, supra note 5, at 239; Trepte, Public Procurement in the EU (Oxford University Press, 2007), at 8. 
18 Trepte, Public Procurement in the EU, ibid. On the discussion and arguments for a de minimus test in the 
context of the free movement of goods see: Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (OUP, 2nd ed. 
2006), at 434-435 and 440-441. This was discussed by several Advocates General, for example Advocate 
General Jacobs in Case C-412/93, Leclerc-Siplec v. TFI Publicité and M6 Publicité [1995] ECR I-179. 
However, such a test would not apply to measures which discriminated against imports as they are prohibited by 
Article 34 TFEU as such, even where their effect was only slight, see Arnull, ibid., at 435. 
19 Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90, Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA and Publivia SAE v. Departamento 
de Sanidad y Seguridad Social de la Generalidad de Cataluña [1991] ECR I-4151. 
20 For example: Case C-50/80, Dansk Supermarked A/S v. A/S Imerco [1981] ECR 181. 
21 Joined Cases C-177/82 and 178/82, Jan van der Haar and Kaveka de Meern BV [1984] ECR 1797. See: 
Gormley, Prohibiting Restrictions on Trade within the EEC (North-Holland, 1985), at 261. 
22 See for example Article 15(3) Public Sector Procurement Directive 2014/24/EU on secret contracts and 
contracts requiring special security measures. 
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Article 36 TFEU and the Cassis jurisprudence do not give a blank cheque to the 
Member States. Measures have to be proportionate. Proportionality requires first, the 
suitability of the measure for the attainment of the desired objective, second, the necessity of 
the measure, meaning that there is no measure less restrictive to the Internal Market at the 
disposal of the Member State in question, and third, the proportionality strictu sensu of the 
measure, requiring a certain balance between the objective and the restriction.23 Only when 
the requirements of this three-part proportionality test are met, a balance between the 
respective public interest ground and the internal market interests in the free movement of 
goods are met. 
 
2.2. Free movement of services and the freedom of establishment 
The Treaties take a similar approach to the Internal Market regimes on the free movement of 
services in Article 56 TFEU and the freedom of establishment in Article 49 TFEU. The 
earlier protects the rights of nationals of the Member States to provide and receive 
commercial or professional services in another Member State on a temporary basis. It is often 
referred to as the freedom to provide services although this is not entirely accurate since the 
freedom also covers the reception of services. The individual or company does not 
permanently leave its Member State of origin and integrates into the economic framework of 
another Member State; that would come under establishment. Although involving the free 
movement of persons, the temporary nature of services makes them similar to goods. 
Therefore, the Court of Justice has been developing principles first developed for goods also 
for services,24 as will be explained further below. 
The freedom of establishment protects the right of nationals of the Member States to 
establish themselves or an agency, branch or subsidiary in another Member State on a 
permanent basis. The self-employed individual or company integrates into the economic 
framework of another Member State, which involves a social dimension for the economic 
actors and their family members which is in many ways akin to the free movement of 
workers regime of the Treaties. The application and principles of these two freedoms are 
largely identical25 and consequently many issues are regulated in the same provisions on the 
freedom of establishment to which the section the free movement of services merely refers.26 
Similar to the mandatory requirements or overriding public interest grounds of the 
Cassis jurisprudence in the context of the free movement of goods, the Court of Justice ruled 
that a measure can be considered outside the field of application of the prohibition of Articles 
56 and 63 TFEU if it represents a proportionate response to an overriding public interest or 
imperative requirement. This applies for example in relation to professional rules justified by 
the common good27 or consumer protection.28 
                                                 
23 Formulated by Advocate General van Gerwen in Case C-159/90, SPUC v. Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685 
including the more controversial third element. Also in favour of the three-part test (based on the same test in 
German administrative law, see Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, supra note 6, at 550), Schwarze, European 
Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 1992), at 712. On proportionality see the seminal article of de 
Búrca, “The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law”, (1993) 13 Yearbook of European Law 
105, 11-112. 
24 See especially the book by Snell, supra note 6. 
25 On the common ground: Case 48/75, Royer [1976] ECR 497. On the differences: Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. 
Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Precuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165. 
26 Article 62 TFEU reads: “The provisions of Articles 51 to 54 shall apply to the matters covered by this 
Chapter.” 
27 Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereiniging Metaalnijverheid [1979] ECR 1299. 
28 Case C-180/89, Commission v. Italy (‘Italian Tourist Guides’) [1991] ECR I-709, other imperative 
requirements are: the functioning of the justice system (Case C-33/74, Van Binsbergen, ibid.), interests of the 
workforce in good relations in the labour market (Case 279/80, Webb [1981] ECR 3305); interests of the holder 
of an insurance policy (Case C-205/84 Commission v. Germany [1986] ECR 3755), conservation of the national 
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Moreover, similar to the public interest grounds that allow derogation from the free 
movement of goods according to Article 36 TFEU outlined above, in Article 52 TFEU the 
Treaty itself stipulates a number of public interest grounds that can justify proportionate 
Member State measures derogating from the prohibition of restrictions of the free movement 
of services and the freedom of establishment. The list is shorter than that of Article 36 TFEU. 
Moreover, Article 51 TFEU is a free movement of persons-specific exemption for certain 
services connected to the exercise of official authority. However, again similar to mandatory 
requirements and justifications in the free movement of goods regime, the Member State 
measures have to be proportionate. 
Procurement laws and policies, wider practices, and independent decisions taken in 
the context of procurement activities can constitute a measure in the sense of Article 56 
TFEU.29 Examples from the case law of the Court of Justice include a requirement for 
companies tendering for contracts involving certain data processing systems to be mainly or 
partly in Italian public ownership,30 a contract clause for the use of Danish labour,31 or a 
French limitation on bringing a labour force from Portugal to perform a contract in France.32 
Similar to Article 34 TFEU there is no de minimis rule whereby an act would be so 
insignificant that it would fall outside the prohibition. The rules on the free movement of 
services apply to all central, federal, regional, and local authorities of the Member States and 
their emanations and all bodies governed by public law for which the Member States can be 
held responsible, to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. As 
services share many similarities with goods, most importantly the location of the tenderer in 
another Member State than the contracting entity, these two regimes are the most relevant for 
the public procurement of goods, services, and works. The freedom of establishment is less 
likely to be affected by procurement decisions since violations of these rules normally happen 
independently from procurement procedures. However, as outlined above the regime is 
closely connected and partly overlaps with that on services. 
 
2.3. The Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
A general principle of prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of nationality is 
stipulated in Article 18 TFEU. The principle is generally not applied independently33 since it 
is also contained in the more specific free movement of regimes of the Treaty. The principle 
“requires that persons in a situation governed by [Union] law be placed on a completely equal 
footing with nationals of the Member State.”34 The principle only applies to nationals of the 
Member States of the EU and individuals and legal persons who are resident in them, not to 
nationals from third countries. 
Since most public procurement decisions, regarding for example, qualification, short-
listing, or contract award are already covered by the regimes particularly on the free 
                                                                                                                                                        
historical and artistic heritage (Case C-180/89), social policy interests and the fight against fraud in the context 
of lotteries and gambling, protection of intellectual property rights, quality and pluralism of broadcasting (Case 
C-352/85, Bond van de Adverteerders v. Nederland [1988] ECR 2085), coherence of domestic taxation systems, 
or the preservation of the good reputation of the national financial sector. 
29 See: Case C-243/89, Commission v. Denmark (‘Storebaelt’), supra note 17, where the contracting entity’s 
requirement in the specifications to include national products and labour was held to be incompatible with 
Article 34 TFEU; Case C-359/93, Commission v. The Netherlands (‘UNIX’), supra note 17; Case C-59/00, Bent 
Mousten Vestergaard v. Spøttrup Boligselskab, supra note 17. See also Arrowsmith, supra note 5, at 185; 
Trepte, supra note 17, at 8. 
30 Case C-3/88, Commission v. Italy (‘Re Data Processing’) [1989] ECR 4035. 
31 Case C-243/89, Commission v. Denmark (‘Storebaelt’), supra note 17. 
32 Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa v. Office national d’immigration [1990] ECR I-1417. 
33 Case C-307/87, Commission v. Greece [1989] ECR I-461. 
34 Case C-187/87, Cowan v. Trésor Public [1989] ECR 195, at 219. 
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movement of goods and services outlined above, these more specific regimes will in most 
cases derogate the more general prohibition of the discrimination on grounds of nationality in 
Article 18 TFEU. Thus there is no need of Article 18 TFEU in the procurement context.35 
 
3. Secondary EU Law: the procurement Directives (and some Regulations)36 
As there is a traditional protectionist tendency in many Member States to award public 
procurement contracts to domestic national industries and service providers, further detailed 
regulation beyond the TFEU was necessary. Moreover, more generally not every little detail 
of economic law can be determined in the TFEU itself.  
Therefore, legal bases for the EU institutions to introduce more specialised 
‘secondary’ EU legislation are stipulated in the Treaty: Articles 53 (2), 62, and 114 TFEU are 
the most relevant for procurement legislation.37 This legislation is called secondary because it 
depends on the primary legal bases in the TFEU. The type of legal instrument chosen for 
public procurement was the Directive. An EU Directive can be described as a model law 
agreed at EU level which sets out the basic parameters and objectives of legislation which 
then has to be transposed into the national laws of the 28 Member States by a specified 
deadline. Within certain limits, the Member States are free to choose the method of 
transposition, as long as the resulting national instrument is fully compliant with the original 
EU Directive. For public procurement, EU legislation involved the enactment of six 
Directives: the Public Sector Procurement Directive 2014/24/EU,38 the Public Sector 
Remedies Directive 89/665/EEC,39 the Utilities Procurement Directive 2014/25/EC,40 the 
Utilities Remedies Directive 92/13/EEC,41 the Concessions Directive 2014/23/EU42 and the 
Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC.43  
 The Directives are very detailed and share common features. They require, in short, 
the publication of all contracts awarded by government and other public entities above certain 
                                                 
35 Arrowsmith, supra note 5, at 301-302, also arguing against J. Winter, “Public Procurement in the E.C.” (1991) 
Common Market Law Review 741, at 762 that Article 18 TFEU (then 12 and 6 EC respectively) does not apply 
to entities not covered by the free movement regimes. 
36 The first part of this section is based on: Trybus, Caranta and Edelstam, supra note 1, at 3-5. 
37 See the Preambles to all EU procurement Directives. 
38 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L94/65. For overviews of this Directive see: 
Lichère, Caranta and Treumer (eds.) Modernising Public Procurement: The New Directive (Djøf: Copenhagen, 
2014); Caranta, “The changes to the public contract directives and the story they tell about how EU law works” 
(2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 391–459; Issues 3 and 4 of the (2014) 23 Public Procurement Law 
Review; and Skovgaard Ølykke and Sánchez Graells (eds.), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public 
Procurement Rules in 2014 (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2016).  
39 Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and 
public works contracts, OJ [1989] L 395/33–35 as amended especially by Directive 2007/66/EC [2007] OJ 
L335/31.  
40 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC 
[2014] OJ L94/243. 
41 Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in 
the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, OJ [1992] L-76/14 as amended especially by 
Directive 2007/66/EC [2007] OJ L335/31. 
42 Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of 
concession contracts [2014] OJ L94/1. 
43 Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting 
authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC 
and 2004/18/EC, OJ [2009] L-216/76. 
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thresholds in the Official Journal of the EU (OJEU), rules on technical specifications,44 the 
award of these contracts on the basis of prescribed detailed procedures, rules on the 
qualification of bidders,45 and award criteria.46 It also involves the operation of efficient 
enforcement and remedies systems for aggrieved bidders, which is the subject of separate 
Remedies Directives for the public sector (665/89/EEC) and utilities (92/13/EEC). Again, the 
main objective of this legal framework is to open the public procurement markets of the 
Member States in addition and amplifying the Treaty regimes on the free movement of goods 
and free movement of services. Therefore, non-discrimination on grounds of nationality is the 
crucial objective of this secondary legislation, but the achievement of value for money, 
transparency, competition, non-discrimination and equal treatment of bidders are all linked to 
that main objective. More recently the Union has been moving towards also aiming to 
promote social and environmental objectives,47 promote innovation, or to fight corruption, 
but these are not the main objectives. The following pages will provide a brief overview over 
the main issues addressed in the Directives, notably their coverage (3.1), procedures (3.2), 
publication (3.3), technical publications (3.4), contract conditions (3.5), qualification and 
selection (3.6), award criteria (3.7), and review and remedies (3.8).   
 
3.1 Coverage 
All Directives dedicate a substantial part of their provisions to their personal and material 
coverage, in other words the types of entities that have to follow the rules of the respective 
Directive (personal) and the types of contracts the respective Directive applies to (material).48 
There is common ground but also certain differences between the various Directives 
regarding this crucial issue. 
 With regards to personal coverage, Public Sector Directive 2014/24/EU applies to all 
public bodies and institutions at the central government levels of the Member States, their 
federal State governments (Germany, Austria), regions (France, Belgium), autonomous 
communities (Spain), provinces (Italy, Netherlands), departments, counties (UK, Ireland), 
districts, municipalities, to the smallest village. Moreover, the Directive covers “bodies 
governed by public law, associations formed by one or several of such authorities or one or 
several of such bodies governed by public law.” This means that any entity controlled and 
financed by the government of a Member State is covered by the Directive. This goes deeper 
than the requirements of the World Trade Organisation’s Government Procurement 
Agreement. Interestingly, the Directive does not apply to the EU institutions who created the 
Directive.49 The Utilities Directive 2014/25/EU applies to companies operating in the water 
supply, energy, transport and other sectors. While these companies are now mostly not in 
public ownership but are large privatised, they used to be government owned and still operate 
within a monopolised market. If real competition is established in a particular market, the 
                                                 
44 Burgi, “Specifications”, in Trybus, Caranta, Edelstam, supra note 1, 37. 
45 Steinicke, “Qualification and Shortlisting” in Trybus, Caranta, Edelstam, ibid., 105. 
46 Franch, and Grau, “Award Criteria” in Trybus, Caranta, Edelstam, supra note 1, 125. 
47 See: Caranta and Trybus (eds.), The Law of Green and Social Procurement (Djøf: Copenhagen, 2010); 
Arrowsmith and Kunzlik (eds.) Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law (Cambridge: CUP, 
2009); McCrudden, Buying Social Justice. Equality, Government Procurement and Legal Change (OUP: 
Oxford, 2007); Arrowsmith, “Horizontal Policies in Public Procurement: A Taxonomy” (2010) 10 Journal of 
Public Procurement 149; Kunzlik, ‘Green Public Procurement—European Law, Environmental Standards and 
‘What to Buy’ Decisions’ (2013) 25 Journal of Environmental Law 173; Semple, A Practical Guide to Public 
Procurement (Oxford, OUP, 2015), chaper 7. 
48 See: Noguellou, “Scope and Coverage of the EU Procurement Directives”, in Trybus, Caranta, Edelstam, 
supra note 1, 15. 
49 See: Stelkens and Schröder, “Substantive Law applicable to EU Public Contracts”, in  Trybus, Caranta, 
Edelstam, ibid., 395. 
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relevant sector is taken out of the field of application of the Utilities, as happened to the 
telecommunications sector.  This history and special status of utilities in the European market 
motivated the legislator to regulate their procurement in a separate but more flexible 
Directive, a special feature of EU procurement law.50 Consequently, Arrowsmith calls her 
leading English language book The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement.51 The Defence 
and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC, which also contains more flexible rules than 
Directive 2014/24/EU, and the Concessions Directive 2014/23/EU have the same coverage as 
the Public Sector and Utilities Directive combined; the difference to the other instruments lies 
in their material coverage.  
An important part of material coverage are the thresholds of minimum contract values 
below which the Directives do not apply. However, this does not limit the application of the 
TFEU regimes outlined above, which led to a Treaty-based regime of minimum standards for 
contracts below these thresholds52 which have been amplified by the Court of Justice and 
shall briefly be discussed under section 6 below. The thresholds differ slightly between the 
Directives and are fixed in Euros and updated in Regulations on a biannual basis.53 For 
central government contracts they currently stand at €135,000 for supplies and services 
(€209,000 for authorities below the central level) and at €5,225,000 for works procured by 
any contracting entity. Moreover, there is a list of exceptions excluding contract types and 
certain situations from the field of application of the Directives. These include the acquisition 
or rental of property, conciliation and legal services, employment contracts, political 
campaign services and loans. The list of exclusions is particularly long in the Defence and 
Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EU where it notably also features the large 
European collaborative projects for major new equipment and contracts between 
governments.54 Overall, it can be said the thresholds and exceptions exclude about 85 per 
cent of all public and utilities procurement in the EU from their field of application.     
 
3.2 Procedures 
The Public Sector Directive provides for a maximum of six main types of procurement 
procedure: open, restricted, negotiated with competition, competitive dialogue, innovation 
partnership, negotiated without competition. Moreover, there are ‘accelerated versions’ of the 
restricted procedure and competitive negotiations for urgency situations with shorter time 
limits. Finally, there are the ‘special procedures’, namely framework agreements, dynamic 
purchasing systems, and electronic auctions. The open procedure allows for a maximum of 
competition and transparency. Based on a detailed (technical) description or specifications of 
the good, service or work to be procured, and in response to a contract notice to be published 
in the OJEU, all interested economic operators, subject to qualification, can bid for the 
contract.  
The restricted procedure shares many features with the open procedure but there is an 
additional stage. Under both the Public Sector and the Defence Directives, detailed 
specifications have to be finalised and a contract notice is published in the OJEU. Economic 
operators interested in the contract first have to send a request to participate. This request to 
participate is not a full tender but simply a short document which expresses the wish to 
                                                 
50 See: Torricelli, “Utilities Procurement”, in Trybus, Caranta, Edelstam, supra note 1, 223. 
51 Arrowsmith, (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 1st ed. 1996, 2nd ed. 2005, 3rd ed. 2014).   
52 Risvig Hamer, “Requirements for Contracts ‘Outside’ the Directives” in Trybus, Caranta and Edelstam, supra 
note 1, 191. 
53 See for example: Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/2170/EU of 24 November 2015 amending 
Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of the application thresholds for 
the procedures for the award of contracts (Text with EEA relevance) OJ 2015 L307/5.  
54 See: Trybus, “Defence Procurement” in Trybus, Caranta, Edelstam, supra note 1, 249. 
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participate and information about the economic operator. This will be followed by a 
shortlisting or selection process based on objective and regulated criteria and only the 
selected operators, a minimum of five in the Public Sector Directive and three in the Defence 
Directive, will be invited to bid. Then the selected operators have to send their full tenders. 
The contract will be awarded to one of the qualified bidders who submitted a compliant bid 
on the basis of the established award criteria. Similar to the open procedure, the restricted 
procedure requires finalised technical specifications when the contract is advertised and 
negotiations between contracting entity and bidders are prohibited.  
For competitive negotiations, as in the restricted procedure, a contract notice is 
published in the OJEU and interested economic operators have to send a request to participate 
to the contracting authority. There is also a shortlisting process as in the restricted procedure 
which is based on objective and regulated criteria and only the shortlisted operators, a 
minimum of three, will be invited to bid. However, this is where the similarities with the 
restricted procedure end. First, there are no finalised and detailed specifications at the 
beginning of the procurement process, only requirements. Moreover, the selection of three 
operators in the first stage will be followed not by bids but by negotiations with the 
shortlisted operators, followed by a best and final offer. 
The competitive dialogue shares many features with competitive negotiations but 
negotiations are more strictly regulated. As the other procedures, the competitive dialogue 
requires the publication of a contract notice in the OJEU which shall set out their needs and 
requirements, detailed technical specifications are not required from the beginning of the 
process. As in the restricted procedure and the negotiated procedure with prior publication of 
a contract notice, interested bidders can send a request to participate.55 There is also a 
shortlisting process which is based on objective and regulated criteria and only the shortlisted 
operators, a minimum of three, will be invited to bid. Then, “[c]ontracting authorities/entities 
shall open with the candidates selected […] a dialogue, the aim of which shall be to identify 
and define the means best suited to satisfying their needs. They may discuss all aspects of the 
contract with the chosen candidates during this dialogue.” The new innovation partnership 
procedure shares many features with the competitive dialogue but is intended to foster 
innovation in the process. 
For the negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice there is no 
obligation to publish a contract notice and there are generally only very few procedural 
requirements. The contracting authority or entity may simply start unstructured negotiations 
with only one provider, although it may also do so with more than one provider or follow a 
more structured approach. The Directives require the publication of a contract award notice 
which must include a justification for the use of the procedure based on one of the limited 
situations expressly provided in the Directives. 
In the context of the Public Sector Directive, contracting authorities can choose freely 
between the open and restricted procedures but the use of all other procedures is limited to 
specific situations expressly addressed in the instrument. In the context of the more flexible 
Utilities Directive contracting entities can additionally freely chose competitive negotiations. 
This is also the case in the context of the Defence Directive, which does not provide for the 
open procedure. The use of all other procedures – competitive dialogue, innovation 
partnerships, and especially the negotiated procedure without competition is strictly limited to 
prescribed situations. These situations are particularly exceptional for the latter, essentially 
single-source procurement, as the use of this procedure is close to procuring outside the 
framework of the Directives. Overall, the procedures are tightly regulated to ensure 
transparency, competition, and non-discrimination but also accommodate flexibility, 
                                                 
55 For example: Article 33(2) Defence Directive. 
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especially in the context of the Utilities and Defence Directives. Moreover, innovative 
procurement procedures and modern purchasing techniques, most notably electronic 
procurement can be accommodated within these procedures.       
 
3.3 Publication 
With the exception of the negotiated procedure without competition, the public procurement 
procedures begin with the publication of a contract notice in Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), 
the electronic version of the Supplement to the OJEU.56 This means that all contracts above 
the thresholds are published in one electronic portal using the same format. This is obviously 
crucial for the transparency objectives of EU procurement law. However, it is also crucial to 
create competition and to ensure market access: economic operators cannot bid for contracts 
in other Member States when they do not know about them. Only after publication on TED 
can contracts be advertised in other and also national media. There are additional publication 
requirements, most notably regarding award notices once a procedure has concluded.   
 
3.4 Technical specifications 
For the open and restricted procedures, the procurement rules on technical specifications 
defining the good, work, or service to be procured are mainly intended to prevent ‘product 
definitions’ to be abused to reduce the pool of possible bidders and to lead to discrimination 
of tenderers because of their nationality.57 After all, it is easy to tailor technical specifications 
for a particular domestic provider. Discriminatory product specifications would also be 
measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions in violation of Article 34 TFEU 
as outlined under section 2.1.1 above, unless justified by Article 36 TFEU or the Cassis 
jurisprudence. This made it particularly important to address this issue in sufficient detail in 
the secondary law Directives to ensure a harmonised approach across the 28 Member States. 
Technical specifications are frequently the subject of judgments of the CJEU58 and review 
proceedings at the national level.59 
 
3.5 Performance conditions 
Closely connected to specifications are performance conditions. The substantive Directives 
2014/24/EU, 2014/25/EU and 2009/81/EC allow contract performance conditions, as long as 
these comply with EU law and are indicated in the contract documentation.60 The 
requirement of compatibility with EU law means mainly that contract conditions must not be 
directly or indirectly discriminatory.61 The requirement of the contract conditions to be 
communicated at the beginning of the procurement procedure partly explains their close 
connection to the specifications regulating the very beginning of the procurement procedure. 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 http://ted.europa.eu/TED/misc/chooseLanguage.do [accessed 17 March 2017]. 
57 On the rules of Utilities Directive and Public Sector Directive see: Bovis, EC Public Procurement: Case Law 
and Regulation (OUP, 2007), at 220-223 and 397-399 and Burgi, “Specifications” in Trybus, Caranta, and 
Edelstam, supra note 1, 37. 
58 See:  Case C-45/87, Commission v. Ireland (‘Dundalk’) [1988] ECR 4929 and Case C-359/93, Commission v. 
the Netherlands (‘UNIX’), supra note 17. 
59 See the country chapters in Treumer and Lichère (eds.), Enforcement of the EU Public Procurement Rules 
(Djøf Publishing: Copenhagen, 2011).  
60 Contract notices, contract documents, descriptive documents or supporting documents, see for example 
Articles 20, 22, and 23 Defence Directive.   
61 See: Comba, “Effects of EU Law on Contract Management” in Trybus, Caranta, and Edelstam, supra note 1, 
317. 
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3.6 Qualification and selection 
Procurement qualification rules address the need to procure from reliable, appropriately 
trained, capable, experienced and trustworthy economic operators.62 According to the case 
law of the CJEU, qualitative selection criteria have to be clearly distinguished from the award 
criteria discussed in the next section below: the earlier concern the quality of the bidder not 
the product or service subject to the tender.63 The objective is to protect contracting 
authorities and entities from unreliable suppliers and providers who will not deliver in the 
end. Therefore, the objective is ultimately to ensure the fulfilment of the primary objective of 
procurement: to provide the contracting entity with what it needs to operate. This objective is 
compromised or undermined if the company in question or companies in its supply chain go 
bankrupt or run into difficulties with the authorities of the country in which they are situated 
for criminal, tax, or other reasons. Not having the technical capacity, the organisation, or the 
skilled manpower to fulfil the eventual contract is at least equally problematic. The financial 
and technical capacity of possible contract partners has to be ensured. On the other hand, 
qualification – or rather disqualification – offers opportunities for discrimination against 
bidders from other Member States. Therefore, it needed to be addressed in the Directives. 
Qualification is generally a delicate stage leading to judgments of the CJEU64 many 
complaints and review proceedings at the national level.65 Nothing motivates an economic 
operator more to initiate review proceedings than being disqualified since the reasons will 
also be connected to their reputation. 
 
3.7 Award Criteria 
Traditionally the substantive Directives provided for the lowest price and the economically 
most advantageous tender as award criteria to determine the winner of competitive 
procurement procedures.66 The criterion of the economically most advantageous tender 
allows taking account of a multitude of economic (sub-) criteria which are connected to the 
subject matter of the contract, such as quality, delivery date, after-sales service, etc. The 2014 
reforms removed the lowest price award criterion from the Public Sector and Utilities 
Directives and never included it in the Concessions Directive. It is now only contained in the 
Defence Directive and will probably be removed from it in the next revision of the 
instrument.  Award criteria other than lowest price are the final stage where discrimination on 
grounds of nationality can take place and discriminatory award criteria would already qualify 
as violations of the TFEU regimes on the free movement of goods and services, unless 
justified. Therefore, it was necessary to also address this issue in more detailed rules in the 
procurement Directives to ensure a harmonised approach to this issue across the 28 Member 
States.  Award criteria are also frequently the subject of court decisions of the CJEU67 and in 
national review proceeding.68 
                                                 
62 On the rules of the Utilities Directive and Public Sector Directive see: Trepte, supra note 17, at 335-353 
Bovis, supra note 57, at 224-233 and 399-416; Steinicke, “Qualification and Shortlisting” in Trybus, Caranta, 
and Edelstam, supra note 1, 105. 
63 Especially Case C-532/06, Lianakis [2008] ECR I-251, at paragraphs 25 to 32.   
64 See: Case C-76/81, Transporoute et Travaux SA v. Minister of Public Works [1982] ECR 417; Case C-
389/92, Ballast Nedam Group NV v. Belgian State [1994] ECR I-1289; Case C-225/98, Commission v. France 
(‘Nord-Pas-de-Calais’) [2000] ECR I-7445; Joined Cases C-27-29/86, CEI and Bellini [1987] ECR 3347. 
65 See the country chapters in Treumer and Lichère, supra note 59. 
66 On the rules of the Utilities Directive and Public Sector Directive see: Trepte, supra note 17, at 462-480; 
Bovis, supra note 57, at 263-264 and 429-442; Franch and Grau, “Contract Award Criteria” in Trybus, Caranta, 
and Edelstam, supra note 1, 125. 
67 See: Case C-324/93, Evans Medical [1995] ECR I-563; Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland [2002] ECR 
I-7213; C-324/03, Contse [2005] ECR I-9315. 
68 See the country chapters in Treumer and Lichère, supra note 59. 
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3.8 Remedies system 
Specific Remedies Directives for the public sector (665/89/EEC) and utilities (92/13/EEC) 
require a national remedies system allowing aggrieved bidders to initiate review proceedings 
against procurement decisions. For defence and concessions such requirements are an integral 
part of the substantive Directives 2009/81/EC69 and 2014/23/EU. The Member States have to 
establish review bodies with the additional possibility to appeal the decisions of these bodies 
in an independent court of law.70 Member States may establish specific procurement review 
bodies or use existing courts - or both. They use ordinary, commercial, or administrative 
courts.71 For example, in France procurement cases are brought in the administrative courts 
(up to the Conseil d’État), in England and Wales in the High Court, and in Germany in 
specialised procurement review chambers in the first instance and the ordinary high courts 
(Oberlandesgerichte) in the second instance. The Directives also prescribe certain minimum 
procedural requirements and the remedies these review bodies can award.72 Before the 
conclusion or making of the contract, the review bodies can set aside any relevant 
procurement decision: discriminatory technical specifications, the rejection of a tender, a 
disqualification, or even the award of the contract. The national review systems have to 
provide for final decisions and interlocutory procedures. After the conclusion or making of 
the contract, the review body can traditionally only award damages, a frequently 
unsatisfactory remedy. Thus, many contracting entities ‘rush to signature’ to limit the 
available remedies. The CJEU has developed a doctrine which addresses this situation. In 
Alcatel73 it ruled that a certain period of time has to elapse between the award decision and 
the conclusion or making of the contract, a period which the 2007 reform of the Remedies 
Directives74 set at normally 10 days. This facilitated and thus increased review proceedings in 
many Member States. With the 2007 reform the EU legislator also introduced the new 
remedy of ‘ineffectiveness’ which allows review bodies to annul an already concluded public 
contract within strict time limits if grave violations of procurement law have occurred, 
including the violation of the 10 day Alcatel standstill period and the direct illegal award 
without any respect for procurement law. As a consequence of the Directives, the national 
review and remedies systems of the Member States share a number of common features. 
However, there are also considerable differences. France and Germany, for example, see over 
1,000 review proceedings each, with about half of them successful in the first instance.75 In 
England and Wales there are only very few cases each year, although there is anecdotal 
                                                 
69 See: Trybus, “The hidden Remedies Directive: review and remedies under the EU Defence and Security 
Remedies Directive” (2013) 22 Public Procurement Law Review 135-155 
70 See: Wauters, “Review Bodies” in Trybus, Caranta, Edelstam, supra note 1, 341.  
71 See: Trybus, Blomberg, Gorecki, Public Procurement Review and Remedies Systems in the European Union 
(SIGMA Paper 41, Paris, 2007) with overviews of the remedies systems of 23 the then 25 Member States and 
Romania and Bulgaria. 
72 See: C. Bovis, “Remedies”, in Trybus, Caranta, Edelstam, supra note 1, 363. 
73 Case C-81/98, Alcatel Austria  AG and Others, Siemens AG Österreich, Sag-Schrack Anlagentechnik AG v. 
Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Verkehr [1999] ECR I-1477. 
74 This refers to amendments of the Remedies Directives through Directive 2007/66/EC [2007] OJ L335/31. 
75 For France see: Lichère and Gabayet, “Enforcement of the Public Procurement Rules in France” in Treumer 
and Lichère, supra note 59, at 299-328 and Trybus, Blomberg, and Gorecki, supra note 71, at 62. For Germany 
see: Burgi, “EU Procurement Rules – A Report about the German Remedies System, in Treumer and Lichère, 
ibid., at 105-154 and Trybus, Blomberg, and Gorecki, ibid., at 67. 
16 
 
evidence for many out of court settlements.76 This can partly be explained by the high costs 
of proceedings in England and a generally less litigious society.77       
 
4. Case law 
While the TFEU but especially the Directives discussed under the previous headings address 
the procurement process in great detail, there are still considerable gaps and uncertainties. 
Many of these are addressed by national procurement review bodies and courts. However, 
there is a clear need for a common interpretation of EU law in general and EU public 
procurement law in particular. This is provided by the CJEU in Luxembourg. Some 
judgements relevant for public procurement are the result of enforcement actions brought by 
the European Commission against Member States for violations of EU law under Article 258 
TFEU.78 However, most of the relevant judgements were issued as a result of the procedure 
under Article 267 TFEU. In this procedure a case arising in a national court of one of the 
Member States leads to a preliminary reference to the CJEU asking for an interpretation of 
EU law to decide the national case. The resulting case law can concern an interpretation of 
the rules of the Treaty applying to public and utilities procurement79 or the interpretation of 
the procurement Directives. It would go beyond the aims of this paper to discuss this case law 
in detail. However, it is important to highlight the importance of the public procurement case 
law of the CJEU as a distinct and crucial source of EU public procurement law, especially 
when particular details and problems are not addressed in the legislation.   
 An important feature of EU procurement law is that important concepts and principles 
are often first established by the CJEU and only later codified by the EU legislator through 
amendments of the Directives. Prominent examples are the standstill period between the 
award and the conclusion or making of the contract in the Alcatel judgment80 discussed under 
section 3.8 above and the regulation of modifications to already concluded contracts in the 
Pressetext judgment.81 These are not examples of judicial overreach. The judgments of the 
CJEU arise out of real life cases detecting gaps and problems that the legislator, who has to 
draft provisions in the abstract, cannot always anticipate. Thus, in addition to the Treaty 
                                                 
76 See: Trybus, “An Overview of the United Kingdom Public Procurement Review and Remedies System with 
an Emphasis on England and Wales” in Lichère and Treumer, supra note 59, 201-234 and Trybus, Blomberg, 
and Gorecki, ibid., at 107. 
77 For the time before Alcatel: ‘The Wood Review’: Investigating UK Business Experiences in Competing for 
Public Contracts in other EU Countries, HM Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry (2004), on 
file. The costs were identified as a deterrent to litigation by Pachnou, “Bidder remedies to enforce the EC 
procurement rules in England and Wales” (2003) 12 Public Procurement Law Review 35. 
78 Examples include: Case C-263/85, Commission v. Italy [1991] ECR I-2457; Case C-45/87, Commission v. 
Ireland (‘Dundalk’), supra note 58; Case C-3/88, Commission v. Italy (‘Re Data Processing’), supra note 30; 
Case C-243/89, Commission v. Denmark (‘Storebaelt’), supra note 17; C-360/89, Commission v. Italy [1992] 
ECR I-3401; Case C-272/91, Commission v. Italy (‘Lottomatica’) [1994] ECR I-1409; Case C-87/94, 
Commission v. Belgium (‘Walloon Buses’) [1996] ECR I-2043; Case C-359/93, Commission v. The Netherlands 
(‘UNIX’), supra note 17. 
79 Examples include: Case 76/81, Transporoute et Travaux SA v. Ministère des travaux publics [1982] ECR 
417; Case 21/88, Du Pont de Nemours Italiana v. Unita Sanitara Locale di Carara [1990] ECR 889; Case C-
113/89, Rush Portuguesa v. Office national d’immigration, supra note 32; Unitron Scandinavia [1999] ECR I-
8291; Case C-324/98, Telaustria [2000] ECR I-10745; Case C-470/99, Universale Bau AG [2002] ECR I-
11617; Case C-59/00, Bent Mousten Vestergaard v. Spøttrup Boligselskab, supra note 17; Case C-358/00, 
Buchhändler Vereinigung, [2002] ECR I-4685; Case C-231/03, Coname, [2005] ECR I-7287; Case C-234/03, 
Contse and others, [2005] ECR I-9315. 
80 Case C-81/98, Alcatel, supra note 73, now codified in Article 2a of the Public Sector Remedies Directive 
89/665/EEC as amended in 2007. 
81 C-454/06, Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur v. Austria [2008] ECR I-4401 now codified in Article 72 Public 
Sector Directive 2014/24/EU. 
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principles and procurement Directives, the procurement practitioner and layer needs to be 
aware of the case law of the CJEU on public procurement.        
  
5. The second life of secondary EU law: after transposition 
The EU Member States had to transpose the Directives into their national laws by a deadline 
specified in each procurement Directive. If a timely transposition into national law occurred 
and resulted in national legislation which is fully compliant with the requirements of the 
Directive, the original Directive will only be used as a comparator and for interpretation in 
the national case law. The binding procurement law in that jurisdiction, however, will be the 
national law that transposed the Directive.  
Member States who did not have a binding national public procurement law before 
the EU public procurement Directives, for example the United Kingdom82 or Ireland,83 
implemented the Directives by introducing national legislation that followed them very 
closely, at times almost word for word. The traditional approach to implementation of the 
Directives in Denmark is interesting in this respect. Rather than drafting national regulations, 
the Danish legislation simply made the Directives directly applicable in Denmark. 
Consequently, Danish contracting entities used to follow the Directives directly.84 However, 
Member States that did have a long tradition of public procurement legislation, such as for 
instance France with its Code de marchés publics85 and Germany with its 
Verdingungsordnungen,86 had to amend their pre-existing national laws to comply with the 
Directives. In these Member States, a difficult and onerous process had carefully transposed 
every single requirement of the Directives into the pre-exiting national laws. This legislative 
method of Directives which then have to be transposed in the Member States causes many 
problems because at times Member States did not implement the Directives fully or before 
the deadline.87 However, the Directives ultimately led to 28 national Member State 
procurement laws which are more or less harmonised as far as contracts covered by the 
Directives are concerned.  
                                                 
82 In the United Kingdom Directive, for example 2014/24/EU was transposed with the UK Public Contracts 
Regulations 2015 S.I. 2015 No. 102 which entered in force on 26 February 2015. 
83 In the Republic of Ireland, for example Directive 2014/24/EU was transposed with the European Union 
(Award of Public Authority Contracts) Regulations 2016, S.I. No. 284/2016 which entered into force on 5 May 
2016. 
84 This is described by Treumer, “Green Public Procurement and Socially Responsible Public Procurement: An 
analysis of Danish Regulation and Practice” in Caranta and Trybus (eds.), The Law of Green and Social 
Procurement in Europe (Djøf Publishing: Copenhagen, 2010), 53 at 55.  
85 This traditional approach of a relatively comprehensive CMP has changed with the recent transpositions.  For 
example, Directive 2014/24/EU was transposed by the Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015 consolidée 
par le décret n°2016-360 du 25 mars 2016 (Journal officiel du 27 mars 2016). 
86 The German approach to the transposition of the Directives is rather complex. For example, Directive 
2014/24/EU was transposed in  §§[sections]97–184 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB) 
[English: Act against Restrictions of Competition] BGBl. Teil I Nr. 8 vom 23.02.2016, S. 203 bis 232, the 
Vergabeverordnung (VgV) [English: Public Tender Regulation], see Verordung zur Modernisierung des 
Vergaberechts (VergRModVO) vom 12.04.2016 BGBl. Teil I Nr. 16 S. 624 ff., and the Verdingungsordung für 
Bauleistungen-EU (VOB/A-EU) [English: Contracting Rules for the Award of Public Works] BAnz AT 
01.07.2016 B4 and BAnz AT 19.01.2016 B3. 
87 See with respect to the old Utilities Procurement Directive 2004/17/EC and the old Public Sector Procurement 
Directive: Trybus, “The morning after the deadline: the state of implementation of the new EC Public 
Procurement Directives in the Member States on February 1, 2006” (2006) 15 Public Procurement Law Review 
NA 82-90; Trybus  and Medina, “La transposición de las Directivas comunitarias sobre contratación pública en 
los Estados miembros”, in Rodríguez-Arana Muñoz, Sanz Rubiales, and Sendín García, La Contración 
Administrativa en España e Iberoamérica (Cameron May y La Junta de Castilla y León: London, 2008) 577-
599  and Trybus and Medina, “La transposición de las Directivas comunitarias sobre contratación pública en los 
Estados miembros” 298/2009 Noticias de la Unión Europea 83-94. 
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For example, the Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC was 
transposed in Austria with the Federal Procurement Defence and Security Act 2011,88 in 
Germany with the Competition Act as amended in December 201189 and the Defence and 
Security Procurement Regulation,90 in the Republic of Ireland with the European Union 
(Award of The national Contracts Relating to Defence and Security) Regulations 2012,91 and 
in the United Kingdom with the Defence and Security Contracts Regulations 2011.92  
Therefore, the Directives, which before the deadline for their transposition has passed 
are not legally binding, have a ‘second life’ as 28 transposed national procurement laws. Such 
a Directive can only be enforced by individuals in national review bodies and courts after the 
deadline of their transposition has passed and the Member State in question has not 
transposed that Directive93 through the principle of direct effect.94 A Member State ‘running 
late’ with transposition will sometimes clarify this effect in a circular or decree,95 although 
such a communication is not really necessary as direct effect is a technique of EU law which 
arises irrespective of whether the Member State wills it or not.     
 
6. The second life of primary EU Law and EU case law: below the thresholds  
The regimes of the TFEU on the free movement of goods and services discussed in section 2 
above do not only serve as the foundation of the secondary public procurement Directives 
discussed in section 3 but directly apply to public contracts in two ways. 
First, the TFEU applies on a supplementary basis to public and utilities procurement 
to which the Directives (also) apply.96 Therefore public entities and utilities within the scope 
of the Directives have to follow the provisions of the TFEU in addition to having to follow 
the provisions of the Directives. Since the Directives aim at providing detailed requirements 
on how to conduct procurement procedures according to the Internal Market requirements of 
the TFEU, in theory there should be no discrepancy. However, since the Directives may leave 
gaps and require interpretation, there remains an at times important function of the TFEU 
even with respect to contracts to which the Directives fully apply. Second, the TFEU is 
applicable to the considerable procurement activities falling outside the scope of the 
Directives. This concerns contracts to which the Directives do not apply as their contract 
values are below the thresholds for application of the Directives and to contracts subject to 
the numerous exceptions from the scope of the Directives discussed in section 3.1 above.  
According to the Commission, the latter category and the low value contracts account 
“for the vast majority of public contracts in the EU – over 90% in some Member States.” As 
the provisions of the TFEU therefore apply to varying degrees to most public and utilities 
procurement activities, it could even be argued that the substance of the procurement rules 
directly emanating from the TFEU is more important than those of the detailed Directives.  
                                                 
88 Bundesgesetz über die Vergabe von Aufträgen im Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsbereich 
(Bundesvergabegesetz Verteidigung und Sicherheit 2012 – BVergGVS 2012, BGBl. I Nr. 10/2012.  
89 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, of 15 July 2005, BGBl. I S. 2114; 2009 I S. 3850, as last 
amended by Article 1 and Article 4 (2) of the Law of 5 December 2012, BGBl. I S. 2403.   
90 Vergabeverordung für die Bereiche Verteidigung und Sicherheit – VSVgV, BGBl. I S.1509/2012. 
91 European Union (Award of Contracts Relating to Defence and Security) Regulations 2012, SI No. 62 of 2012. 
92 United Kingdom Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1848. 
93 Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v Ratti [1979] ECR 1629, [1980] 1 CMLR 96. 
94 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, [1963] CMLR 
105. 
95 In countries such as Germany or Belgium were transposition of the now old Public Sector Directive 
2004/18/EC was late, this approach is adopted as an interim solution pending final transposition of the 
respective directive into national law. 
96 Braun, “A Matter of Principles(s) – The Treatment of Contracts Falling Outside the Scope of the European 
Public Procurement Directives” (2000) 9 Public Procurement Law Review 39-48, at 41 citing Prieß, Das 
Öffentliche Auftragswesen in der Europäischen Union (Heyermanns: Heidelberg: 1st ed. 1994), at 64. 
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The relevant requirements for all public procurement contracts directly emanating 
from the TFEU have been formulated by the CJEU,97 clarified by the European Commission 
in an Interpretative Communication on contracts falling outside the scope of the Directives of 
200698 and an Interpretative Communication on concessions of 2000,99 and discussed in the 
academic literature.100 The relevant principles according to these sources are non-
discrimination and equal treatment, transparency, proportionality, mutual recognition, and 
equivalence and effectiveness of procurement review proceedings. It would go beyond the 
aims of this chapter to discuss these requirements in detail.101 The Member States have 
reacted differently to these requirements directly emanating from the TFEU. Germany, for 
example, after even challenging the relevant Commission Communication in the Court of 
Justice, only very recently introduced an instrument addressing requirements for contracts 
outside the scope of the Directives.102   
 
7. Conclusions 
EU law and public procurement have a fundamental Internal Market dimension through the 
regimes on the free movement of goods and services. Therefore, they started already 60 years 
ago, with the (EEC) Treaty of Rome, the predecessor of the current TFEU. The free 
movement of goods and services regimes described in section 2 of this paper were not 
sufficient to open the public procurement markets of the Member States. Neither was the first 
set of rather basic Directives introduced in the 1970s, which had little effect. Is was only the 
second generation of procurement Directives in the 1990s that had a significant impact on 
procurement law in the Member States, an effect enhanced by the reforms of 2004 and 2014, 
the 2007 reform of the review system, and the introduction of a Directive for defence 
procurement in 2009. The latest reforms appear to put a stronger emphasis on public 
procurement as an instrument to promote environmental objectives, social policies, Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises, and innovation. However, whatever measure to further such 
secondary objectives was introduced, the opening of the procurement markets of the Member 
                                                 
97 Case C-76/81, Transporoute et Travaux SA v. Ministère des travaux publics, supra note 79; Case C-263/85, 
Commission v. Italy, supra note 79; Case C-45/87, Commission v. Ireland (‘Dundalk’), supra note 58; Case C-
3/88, Commission v. Italy (‘Re Data Processing’), supra note 30; Case C-21/88, Du Pont de Nemours Italiana v. 
Unita Sanitara Locale di Carara, supra note 79; Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa v. Office national 
d’immigration, supra note 32; Case C-243/89, Commission v. Denmark (‘Storebaelt’), supra note 17; C-360/89, 
Commission v. Italy [1992] ECR I-3401; Case C-272/91, Commission v. Italy (‘Lottomatica’) [1994] ECR I-
1409; Case C-87/94, Commission v. Belgium (‘Walloon Buses’) [1994] ECR I-2043; Case C-359/93, 
Commission v. The Netherlands (‘UNIX’), supra note 17; Case C-275/98, Unitron Scandinavia, supra note 17; 
Case C-324/98, Telaustria, supra note 79, Case C-470/99, Universale Bau AG, supra note 79; Case C-59/00, 
Bent Mousten Vestergaard v. Spøttrup Boligselskab, supra note 17; Case C-358/00, Buchhändler Vereinigung, 
supra note 79; Case C-231/03, Coname, supra note 79; Case C-234/03, Contse and others, supra note 79; Case 
C-458/03, Parking Brixen, [2004] ECR I-8585. 
98 Commission Interpretative Communication on the Community law applicable to contracts not or not fully 
subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives, 1 August 2006, OJ [2006] C-179/02. 
99 Commission Interpretative Communication of Concessions under Community Law, 29 April 2000, OJ [2000] 
C-121/2, hereinafter ‘2000 Concessions Communication’. 
100 For example: Dragos and Caranta (eds.), Outside the EU Procurement Directives – Inside the Treaty? (Djøf: 
Copenhagen, 2012); Braun, supra note 96; Pijnacker Hordijk and Meulenbelt, “A Bridge Too Far: Why the 
European Commission’s Attempt to Construct an Obligation to Tender outside the Scope of the Public 
Procurement Directives should be dismissed” (2005) 14 Public Procurement Law Review 123-130; Arrowsmith, 
supra note 5, at 264-276. 
101 The author did so: Trybus, “Public procurement in European Union internal market law”, supra note 1. 
102 The Unterschwellenvergabeordnung (UVgO) [English: Procurement below the Thresholds Regulation] was 
only introduced in January this year (2017): http://www.forum-
vergabe.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Rechtsvorschriften/Unterschwellenvergabeordnung-
UVgO_Bekanntmachung_BMWi_16.01.2017.pdf [accessed 16 March 2017]. 
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States remains at the principal objective of the Treaty, Directives, and case law dimensions of 
EU public procurement law. This Internal Market focus is not surprising as the legal bases for 
the Directives only authorise the EU legislator to introduce public procurement legislation on 
that basis. However, it could be argued that the most significant impact of EU public 
procurement law was not on an economic operator venturing out and bidding for contracts in 
another Member State but on economic operators bidding for contracts in their own Member 
States. This is because while cross-border procurement is only between 2 and 4 per cent of 
the overall procurement market, the TFEU, Directives and CJEU case law had an impact on 
all contracts and over 95 per cent of these contracts are awarded to domestic providers. 
However, the cross-border percentage might well increase over time and it can only do that 
when all contracts are awarded on the basis of the common regime.    
 Distinctive features of EU procurement law beyond the fundamental objective to 
further cross-border procurement are that, in contrast to other international regimes or US 
federal procurement law, it affects all levels of government down to the smallest village and 
that it includes utilities. The still limited importance of most secondary objectives is another 
distinctive feature.  
While in the early 1990s EU public procurement law was a rather unknown subject, 
with only very few obscure court cases, few specialist lawyers, and little academic interest, it 
is today an important subject area with – EU wide – hundreds of review bodies reviewing 
thousands of cases every year, boutique law firms dealing with procurement as well as 
procurement department in most major law firms, academic courses, journals and textbooks, 
and  a lot of related consultancy and for example software industries.      
 
